Violence, Fear, and Jason\u27s Law: The Needless Expansion of Social Control over the Non-Dangerous Mentally Ill in Ohio by MacKeigan, Jessica L.
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Cleveland State Law Review Law Journals
2008
Violence, Fear, and Jason's Law: The Needless
Expansion of Social Control over the Non-
Dangerous Mentally Ill in Ohio
Jessica L. MacKeigan
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Health Law and Policy Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cleveland
State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
Note, Violence, Fear, and Jason's Law: The Needless Expansion of Social Control over the Non-Dangerous Mentally Ill in Ohio , 56
Clev. St. L. Rev. 739 (2008)
? ???? ?????
Citation: 56 Clev. St. L. Rev.  739 2008 
Content downloaded/printed from 
HeinOnline (http://heinonline.org)
Fri Mar  8 15:47:17 2013
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance
   of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license
   agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from 
   uncorrected OCR text.
1
MacKeigan: Violence, Fear, and Jason's Law: The Needless Expansion of Social
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2008
VIOLENCE, FEAR, AND JASON'S LAW: THE NEEDLESS
EXPANSION OF SOCIAL CONTROL OVER THE NON-
DANGEROUS MENTALLY ILL IN OHIO
JESSICA L. MACKEIGAN*
I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................... 739
II. BACKGROUND ...................................................................... 743
A. The Origins of Outpatient Commitment Laws ............. 743
B. Ohio 's Current Civil Commitment Model ................... 747
C. Jason 's Law: Adding Assisted Outpatient
Treatment to the State 's Arsenal ................................. 748
III. JASON'S LAW'S CRITERIA FOR ASSISTED
OUTPATIENT TREATMENT .................................................... 751
IV. THE INFLEXIBILITY OF TREATMENT PLANS
UNDER JASON'S LAW .......................................................... 756
V. COMPELLED MEDICATION AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF
R EFU SA L .............................................................................. 760
VI. OHIO'S LACK OF SUFFICIENT FUNDING TO
SUPPORT JASON'S LAW ........................................................ 763
V II. CONCLUSION ........................................................................ 765
I. INTRODUCTION
Timothy Halton has lived a very troubling life. Diagnosed with a mental illness
at a very young age, he had frequent run-ins with the law over a variety of crimes,
some petty, others violent.' Halton has attacked family members and strangers alike,
.J.D. expected, May 2010, Cleveland State University, Cleveland-Marshall College of
Law; B.S. Baldwin Wallace College. The author would like to thank David K. MacKeigan and
her four children, Kendall, Aidan, Brigid, and Colin for their patience, love, and
understanding; George and Laura Faulkner, her parents, for their support and encouragement;
Henry Patterson for his positive motivation; and Prof. Janice Aitken, Prof. Sheldon Gelman,
Prof. Denise Wimbiscus, Judson Stelter, Alin Rosca, and Cathryn Greenwald for their input
and guidance.
'Phillip Morris, Editorial, 'We Tried to Get Help,'Halton's Mother Says, PLAIN DEALER
(Cleveland), May 31, 2007, at Al, available at 2007 WLNR 10242704. According to
Halton's mother, as a youth Halton killed cats and spent time in a mental institution when he
was only sixteen. Id. He often ranted about killing the President and police officers. Id.;
Halton Crime History, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), May 30, 2007, at A6, available at 2007
WLNR 10134862. Halton's first encounter with the criminal justice system was at the age of
eleven, in 1991, when he received a traffic citation. Id. Over the intervening years, he was
charged with assaulting a male relative in 1999, a sixty-year-old man out for an evening stroll
in 2000, and a police officer in 2003. Id. In 2001, Halton was involuntarily committed to a
mental health treatment center. Id. In 2003, Halton was sentenced to four years of probation
739
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and his family feared for his safety, as well as their own.2 The courts frequently
ordered Halton to receive mental health treatment and gave him probation When
he later attacked a police officer, Halton was found incompetent to stand trial and
received three months of inpatient treatment. After treatment, Halton was sentenced
to four years probation conditioned upon him taking psychotropic drugs.5 Halton's
dangerous behavior and severe mental illness made him a perfect candidate for
compulsory mental health treatment under Ohio's civil commitment laws, under
which he could have received intensive therapy, medication, housing assistance, and
educational and vocational training on an outpatient basis or intensive inpatient
hospitalization if necessary.6 But instead, he spent five months in jail before a bed
opened up at a mental health agency and was ultimately released from probation
after only one year.' The probation department had huge case loads and little time to
offer the intensive care that Halton needed.8 During his probation, Halton had
expressed to his mother his hopes of living a normal life and turning himself around.9
Since then, Halton had voluntarily sought treatment for his mental illness, visiting a
local mental health agency for the homeless about once a month to receive
antipsychotic medications, but recently had begun skipping appointments. °
Tragically, on May 25, 2007, in a quiet suburban neighborhood, Halton shot and
killed a young police officer, Jason West, who had responded to a call about a street
and was required to take anti-psychotic medicine, but upon recommendation of his probation
officer this sentence was cut short after only one year. Id.
2Halton Crime History, supra note 1.
3Rachel Dissell & Damian G. Guevara, Inevitable Showdown: A Slow, Violent Descent,
PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), May 30, 2007, at A6, available at 2007 WLNR 10134918.
4See id.
51d.
6OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.01(B)(1)-(2) (West200l & Supp. 2008) (defining the
criteria for a mentally ill person subject to hospitalization by court order including posing a
"substantial risk of physical harm to self or others"). Services provided by county boards of
alcohol, drug addiction, and mental health services include outpatient care, inpatient
hospitalization, partial hospitalization, rehabilitation, consultation, mental health education
and other preventive services, emergency services, crisis intervention, mental health research,
referral and information, training, substance abuse counseling, service and program
evaluation, community support system, case management, and residential housing. OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 340.09 (West, 2001 & Supp. 2008).
7Dissell, supra note 3.
8According to the supervisor of the probation unit, the county has only six probation
officers which must meet weekly with some 500 mentally ill probationers, a ratio of eighty-
three to one. Id. Halton's mother suspects that he was released from probation early simply
because the county could no longer afford to pay for Halton's psychiatric treatment and his
expensive medication. Morris, supra note I.
9 Morris, supra note 1.
'
0Harlan Spector, Suspect in Officer's Killing Didn't Take His Drugs, Agency Couldn't
Compel Medication for Halton, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), May 31, 2007, at Al, available at
2007 WLNR 10242703. Halton's last visit to the offices of Mental Health Service for
Homeless Persons, Inc. occurred just nineteen days prior to shooting officer West. Id.
[Vol. 56:741
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fight." Typical of such tragedies, the public was left wondering, Could society have
prevented this from happening?
2
In the wake of Officer West's killing and similar incidents of violence
nationwide, public demand for compulsory outpatient treatment of the mentally ill
has grown exponentially. 3 In response, forty-two states have enacted some form of
involuntary outpatient treatment.' 4 Supporters claim such laws protect the public by
reducing the risk of violence among the mentally ill and providing necessary care for
those that are unable or unwilling to voluntarily seek treatment. 5 However, studies
show that such laws have questionable deterrent and therapeutic effects. 6 Detractors
are quick to point out that these laws infringe upon the rights of the mentally ill and
unnecessarily expand social control by the mental health system. 7 As the legal
debate rages, researchers dispute whether mental illness is the sole cause of violence
or whether deeper societal problems, such as poverty, homelessness, and drug use,
are the culprits. 8
"Rachel Dissell et al., Officer's Slaying Stuns Heights: Suspect HadAttacked a Policeman
Before, Got Mental Treatment, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), May 27, 2007, at Al, available at
2007 WLNR 10016731.
12Spector, supra note 10.
13Id. (discussing Seung-Hui Cho, the mentally ill shooter of the Virginia Tech massacre,
and the death of a New York woman pushed in front of a subway train by a schizophrenic
man).
14Treatment Advocacy Center, Standards for Assisted Treatment: State by State Summary,
http://www.psychlaws.org/legalresources/statechart.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2007).
15 John Petrila et al., Debating Outpatient Commitment: Controversy, Trends, and
Empirical Data, 49 CRIME& DELINQ. 157, 160 (2003).
16S. Kisely et al., Compulsory Community and Involuntary Outpatient Treatment for
People with Severe Mental Disorders, COCHRANE DATABASE OF SYSTEMATIC REVIEWS, July
20, 2005, available at http://www.mrw.interscience.wiley.com/cochrane/clsysrev/articles/
CD004408/frame.html; Jennifer Honig & Susan Stefan, New Research Continues to Challenge
the Need for Outpatient Commitment, 31 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 109
(2005).
17Jeffrey W. Swanson et al., Effects of Involuntary Outpatient Commitment on Subjective
Quality of Life in Persons with Severe Mental Illness, 21 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 473, 476 (2003);
DONALD M. LINHORST, EMPOWERING PEOPLE WITH SEVERE MENTAL ILLNESS: A PRACTICAL
GuIDE 51 (2006); see also Jeffrey L. Geller, The Evolution of Outpatient Commitment in the
USA: From Conundrum to Quagmire, 29 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 234,236 (2006).
18R.A. Friedman, Violence and Mental Illness: How Strong is the Link?, 355 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 2064, 2065-66 (2006) (discussing a link between violent behavior of the mentally ill and
substance abuse, poor physical health, and homelessness); John Monahan, Mental Disorder
and Violent Behavior: Perceptions and Evidence, 47 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 511, 519 (1992)
(cautioning that past psychotic symptoms "bear no direct relationship to" the current risk of
violence); C.T. Sheldon et al., Social Disadvantage, Mental Illness and Predictors of Legal
Involvement, 29 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 249, 254 (2006) (discussing factors other than
mental illness that lead to violence, namely drug use, poverty and homelessness); Jeffrey W.
Swanson et al., The Social-Environmental Context of Violent Behavior in Persons Treated for
Severe Mental Illness, 92 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1523, 1524 (2002) (finding an association
2008]
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Ohio has become the most recent state to take up the cause with the introduction
of House Bill 299-known as Jason's Law in memory of Officer Jason West-
which proposes involuntary outpatient care for treatment resistant mentally ill
individuals. 9 Currently, the civil commitment standard in Ohio requires a finding of
present dangerousness or grave disability before a person can be committed to either
inpatient or outpatient care.20  Traditionally, proof of present dangerousness is
"evidence of recent, overt acts and threats of violence [to self or others], instead of
predictions of future dangerous behavior."'2  Grave disability is often used as an
alternative to present dangerousness and requires finding neglect for the person's
basic needs and "an inability to live in the community safely with the assistance of
others. 22 Upon satisfaction of either criterion, a person is subject to court ordered
treatment in the least restrictive environment, a setting that provides a patient with
the greatest personal freedom while still meeting the therapeutic needs of the patient,
which can range from inpatient hospitalization to outpatient care depending on the
severity of illness or risk of harm." Jason's Law represents a major shift in the
current legal structure by eliminating the necessity of proving imminent
dangerousness to self or others, requiring instead that a court find that a treatment
resistant person is likely to become a danger to self or others if left untreated.24 The
chief goal of this legislation is to prevent relapse or violence among the mentally
ill.25 This form of outpatient commitment is frequently referred to as preventative
commitment or, in the case of Jason's Law, as assisted outpatient commitment.26
Presumably, Jason's Law is aimed at preventing harm to the community that
would result if a person is left untreated. At first glance, this is a noble goal, but the
proposed law would cast a much wider net, provide less due process protections, and
ultimately be more restrictive of the rights of non-dangerous persons than current
law is for presently dangerous individuals. This result is completely irrational.
Jason's Law proposes requiring the respondent to participate in the very same
between violent behavior in the mentally ill and homelessness, living in a violent environment
and substance abuse).
19Mark Rollenhagen, Statehouse Bill Could Force Drugs on Mentally Ill, PLAIN DEALER
(Cleveland), Aug. 23, 2007, at BI, available at 2007 WLNR 16479320; H.R. 299, 127th Gen.
Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2007).
2 0OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 5122.01 (West 2001 & Supp. 2008).
21JOHN PARRY & F. PHILIPS GILLIAM, HANDBOOK ON MENTAL DISABILITY LAW 178 (Amy
Allbright ed., 2002).
221d. at 179.
2 3OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 5122.15 (E) (West 2001 & Supp. 2008). A court determines
what is the least restrictive treatment setting by balancing the welfare of the person against the
interest in public safety. State v. Johnson, 512 N.E.2d 652, 655 (Ohio 1987).
24 H.R. 299, 127th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess., at 5 (Ohio 2007).
2 5BILL ANALYSIS, H.R. 299, 127th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess., at 3 (Ohio 2007).
2 6BRUCE J. WINICK, CIVIL COMMITMENT: A THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE MODEL 239
(2005); Robert F. Schopp, Outpatient Commitment: A Dangerous Charade or a Component of
a Comprehensive Institution of Civil Commitment?, 9 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y. & L. 33, 34
(2003).
[Vol. 56:741
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outpatient treatment mandated by current law while eliminating the need to prove
imminent dangerousness, reducing the time to prepare for hearing, extending the
duration of an initial court order, removing all flexibility from treatment plans,
rendering treatment providers powerless to release a recovered patient from care
without court approval, and threatening judicial hospitalization for those who refuse
to comply.27
Jason's Law should not be enacted as written because it will compel respondents
to adhere to outpatient treatment based upon predictions of future danger to self or
others rather than findings of imminent danger or incompetence,28 it will remove
treatment flexibility currently guaranteed by Ohio law by extending the duration of
treatment and limiting a treatment provider's discretion, it will compel the use of
unproven medication over the objections of a presumably competent individual29
without requiring a finding of incompetence, and it will further financially burden an
already overburdened mental health system. Section II will discuss the origins,
justification, and models of involuntary outpatient treatment laws and will outline the
operation of current Ohio civil commitment law and the changes proposed by
Jason's Law. Section III will address the broader criteria of Jason's Law in relation
to current Ohio laws. Section IV will critique Jason's Law's interference with the
doctor-patient relationship and how the proposed law will impose greater restrictions
upon medical decisions than current law does. Section V will address compelled
medication and the consequence for refusal to comply. Finally, Section VI will
address the fiscal feasibility of Jason's Law.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Origins of Outpatient Commitment Laws
The earliest form of outpatient commitment originated in the early 1950s.3" A
shift occurred from a predominant use of inpatient care to treatment in the
community, which reflected a change in beliefs about the state's role in the treatment
of the mentally ill.3 This increased use of outpatient commitment has received
mixed reviews from mental health advocacy groups.
27Ohio H.R. 299 at 5-6.
28ln other words, while existing commitment laws provide for compelled treatment when
the respondent presently or immediately poses a threat or risk of harm to self or others, as
evidenced by recent overt acts or threats of violence, Jason's Law would compel the same
treatment without requiring such evidence if the respondent is mentally ill, mental illness has
been a substantial factor in recent hospitalization or treatment, respondent is currently resistant
to voluntary treatment, and respondent would predictably become a danger to self or others if
left untreated.
29Determinations of incompetency are "separate and distinct" from civil commitment
proceedings. JOHN PARRY & ERIC Y. DROGIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, EVIDENCE AND
TESTIMONY: A COMPREHENSIVE REFERENCE MANUAL FOR LAWYERS, JUDGES, AND MENTAL
DISABILITY PROFESSIONALS 7 (2007).
3 0WINICK, supra note 26, at 239-40; Paul S. Appelbaum, A History of Civil Commitment
and Related Reforms in the United States: Lessons for Today, 25 DEV. MENTAL HEALTH L. 13,
18 (2006).
3 1LINHORST, supra note 17, at 41.
2008]
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In the 1950s, the introduction of new psychotropic medications, concerns about
the costs of inpatient care, and the civil rights movement were the impetus for
outpatient treatment. 32  New drugs facilitated the discharge of state mental health
patients to community treatment.33 Outpatient treatment was viewed as a cheaper
alternative to state hospitalization and as less of an infringement on patients' civil
liberties.34 This movement became known as deinstitutionalization." Then, in the
1970s, several key federal court decisions established safeguards for the rights of the
mentally ill and delineated the standards and procedures by which a person could be
involuntarily committed.36 As a result, modern state civil commitment statutes now
incorporate a dangerousness standard supported by clear and convincing evidence
and procedural due process guarantees.37
Forced treatment of mental illness is justified by the state's parens patria and
police powers.3" According to the tenet of parens patria, the state is justified in
compelling mental health treatment in the best interests of a patient if the patient is
believed to be incapable of competent decision making.39 Alternatively, the state
invokes police powers to protect public health and safety and may order a person
believed to be presently dangerous into involuntary treatment to prevent violence in
the community. 4 The deinstitutionalization movement was a reflection of society's
movement "from more of a medically oriented parens patria approach toward a
legally oriented police power approach."' Thus, the state's focus moved from
comprehensive care in an inpatient setting to inclusive community based treatment,
with hospitalization reserved as a last resort to be used when necessary to prevent
harm to self or others.42
Presently, outpatient commitment consists of three models. The first form is
known as conditional release, whereby involuntary inpatients are discharged and
32WINICK, supra note 26, at 239-40; Appelbaum, supra note 30, at 18.
33WINICK, supra note 26, at 239-40.
341d
351d. at 240-41. The period between 1955 and 1974 saw a sixty-one percent decline in the
population of public mental hospitals, from 558,000 to 215,600. SHELDON GELMAN,
MEDICATING SCHIZOPHRENIA: A HISTORY 41 (1999).
36See Appelbaum, supra note 30, at 18; Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979)
(establishing the clear and convincing standard for civil commitment hearings); O'Connor v.
Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (requiring a finding of dangerousness prior to involuntary
hospitalization); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (holding that
involuntary hospitalization statute must provide adequate procedural safeguards, including
notice, the right to counsel, the privilege against self-incrimination, and a timely hearing).
37LINHORST, supra note 17, at 42.
38BRUCE J. WINICK, THE RIGHT TO REFUSE MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT 285 (Bruce D.
Sales et al. eds., 1997).
391d. at 289.
40 d at 285.
41LINHORST, supra note 17, at 41.
[Vol. 56:741
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may be re-institutionalized if the conditions of their release are not met.43 The
second form mandates community treatment as a less restrictive alternative to
hospitalization for respondents meeting the criteria for civil commitment, but who
are deemed capable of safely surviving in the community with supervision." Under
this model, outpatient and inpatient commitment standards are the same, but
treatment is less restrictive because rather than living in a large, group residence,
respondents are integrated into the community and are permitted to live
independently.45  The third form of outpatient commitment, preventative
commitment or assisted outpatient treatment, recently arose out of concern for the
'revolving-door' syndrome, in which patients get caught in a cycle of impairment,
inpatient treatment, conditional release, and re-hospitalization upon failure to comply
with outpatient treatment.' Under this model, mentally ill individuals who do not
satisfy the traditional criteria for inpatient civil commitment-imminent danger to
self or others or an inability to care for one's basic needs-are ordered into
outpatient care based upon a prediction that if the individual is left untreated, he or
she will deteriorate and become dangerous to self or others.47 This type of treatment
frequently consists of prescribed psychotropic medication, urine and blood tests to
verify compliance with medication orders, psychotherapy, and housing assistance.48
Failure to comply with a treatment order may result in institutionalization. 49 This
final form of outpatient commitment is the most controversial because it restricts the
rights of someone who is not imminently dangerous, but is predicted to become so if
treatment is not mandated.5"
Opinions of mental health advocacy groups are split on the use and effectiveness
of outpatient commitment as a preventative measure.5' Among the detractors,
43 PARRY & GILLIAM, supra note 21, at 184.
441d. at 184-85; WINICK, supra note 26, at 243-44.
4 5PARRY & GILLIAM, supra note 21, at 185, 202.
46Schopp, supra note 26, at 35.
Old, at 34.
48Michael Allen & Vicki Fox Smith, Opening Pandora's Box: The Practical and Legal
Dangers ofInvoluntary Outpatient Commitment, 52 PSYCHIATRIC SERV. 342 (2001).
49Schopp, supra note 26, at 38.
5
°WINICK, supra note 26, at 247. As Winick described it, preventive commitment is based
on the logic that "preventive treatment" will prevent "preventive detention" later down the
road. Bruce J. Winick, A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Model for Civil Commitment, in
INVOLUNTARY DETENTION AND THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES
ON CIVIL COMMITMENT 23, 49 (Kate Diesfeld & Ian R. Freckelton eds., 2003). "The same
logic would justify requiring cancer patients to submit to surgery or chemotherapy they wish
to reject on the basis that the doctor thinks it will cure their cancer, and if they wait for a
spontaneous remission, such treatment will likely be too late." Id.
5'A comprehensive review of numerous empirical studies revealed that court ordered
outpatient commitment had very little effect upon "health service use, costs, social
functioning, mental state, quality of life or satisfaction with care." S. Kisely et al., Compulsory
and Involuntary Outpatient Treatment for People with Severe Mental Disorders, COCHRANE
DATABASE OF SYSTEMATIC REVIEWS, July 20, 2005, available at http://
mrw.interscience.wiley.com/cochrane/clsysrev/articles/CD04408/frame.html. Comparing
2008]
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Mental Health America, formerly known as the National Mental Health Association,
opines in its position statement that "mandatory treatment has not been shown to add
to the effectiveness of community mental health services and, indeed, may interfere
with recovery by compromising personal responsibility and lowering self-esteem."52
Likewise, the Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law calls outpatient commitment a
"dangerous formalization of coercion" that "deters individuals from voluntarily
seeking treatment" and is a "simplistic response that cannot compensate for a lack of
appropriate and effective" community services.53
Proponents, such as the National Alliance on Mental Illness and the American
Psychiatric Association, counter that preventative commitment is necessary to
prevent individuals from needlessly deteriorating before a court can order treatment
and, if properly implemented, "can be a useful tool . . . to improve compliance,
reduce re-hospitalization rates, and decrease violent behavior among [the] . . .
chronically mentally ill."54  Others are more cautionary in their support due to
concerns that outpatient commitment may discourage creative community solutions,
may be disproportionately applied to the poor and African-Americans, and may not
be sufficiently funded to address respondents' basic needs, such as housing and
income assistance.5
mandatory treatment with standard community care, the review revealed that after one year
patients subjected to involuntary outpatient care were just as likely to be hospitalized for
mental treatment or incarcerated as those that received non-compulsory care. Thus,
demonstrating that coercion by the state had little impact upon the effectiveness of care. Id. at
9. The study concluded that a large "number of people would have to receive compulsory
community treatment to gain a positive outcome." Id. at 10.
52Mental Health America, Position Statement 22: Involuntary Mental Health Treatment,
http://nmha.org/go/position-statements/22 (last visited Jan. 10, 2008). "Mental Health
America believes that effective protection of human rights and the best hope for recovery from
mental illness comes from access to voluntary mental health treatment and services that are
comprehensive, community-based, recovery-oriented and culturally competent." Id
53Judge David L. Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, Position Statement on
Involuntary Commitment, http://www.bazelon.org/issues/commitment/positionstatement.html
(last visited Jan. 10, 2008). Formally known as the Mental Health Law Project, the Bazelon
Center was established in 1972 by lawyers and mental health professionals in the interest of
advocating for the rights of the mentally ill. Judge David L. Bazelon Center for Mental Health
Law, About the Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, http://www.bazelon.org/
about/index.htm (last visited April 13, 2008).
54National Alliance on Mental Illness Public Policy Platform, http://archive.psych.org/
edu/otherres/libarchives/archives/199907.pdf (8th ed., Dec. 2007) (last visited Jan. 10,
2008); The American Psychiatric Association, Mandatory Outpatient Treatment Resource
Document, at 2, http://www.psych.org/edu/otherres/lib-archives/archives/199907.pdf (last
visited Jan. 10, 2008).
55AM. Ass'N OF CMTY. PSYCHIATRISTS, POSITION PAPER: INVOLUNTARY OUTPATIENT
COMMITMENT, available at http://www.comm.psych.pitt.edu/finds/ioc.html (June 2001) (last
visited Jan. 10, 2008). A recent New York Times article observed that 42% of assisted
outpatient treatment recipients in the state of New York were African American, while only
34% were white, despite whites comprising 62% of the state population and African
Americans comprising only 16% of the state population. Michael Cooper, Racial
Disproportion Seen in Applying 'Kendra's Law,' N.Y. TIMES, April 7, 2005,
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/07/nyregion/07kendra.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2008).
[Vol. 56:741
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With the introduction of Jason's Law and its proposal for preventative
commitment, Ohio has entered this heated debate, The challenge for Ohio will be
balancing the beneficial aspects of preventative commitment-reduced
hospitalizations and violence-while also avoiding the criticisms so frequently
lobbied at preventative commitment, This can be done by advocating voluntary
compliance, increasing funding of community support systems, and adequately
protecting the rights of the mentally ill.
B. Ohio's Current Civil Commitment Model
Since 1988, the first two models of outpatient commitment, conditional release
and care in the least restrictive setting, have been mandated by statute in Ohio. 6
Civil commitment in Ohio is based upon a finding of imminent danger to self or
others or incapacitation to the point of inability to care for oneself5 7 Outpatient
commitment procedures in Ohio are generally flexible and responsive to the patient's
ever-changing needs.58
Involuntary patients can be admitted by emergency or judicial proceedings. 9
Emergency hospitalization proceedings can be invoked against criminal offenders,
probationers and parolees and can be initiated by clinicians or law enforcement
agents.' Judicial hospitalization proceedings can be brought against any individual
and are commenced "by any person or persons with the court" filing an affidavit.6
The affidavit is investigated by the county mental health board, which verifies that
the respondent satisfies the criteria for compelled treatment or whether alternative
voluntary services are available.62 A probable cause hearing must be held within five
days to determine whether the person does in fact satisfy the criteria for
63commitment.
The commitment criteria require that a person suffering from mental illness must
either: (1) have threatened or attempted to inflict serious harm to self; (2) be
presently dangerous to others as evidenced by recent threats or violent behavior; (3)
be unable to provide for his or her own basic needs which presents "an immediate
risk of serious physical impairment or injury to self' and the community cannot meet
56Mark R. Munetz et al., What Happens When Effective Outpatient Civil Commitment Is
Terminated?, 75 NEW DIRECTIONS FOR MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. 49, 50 (1997); OHIO REV.
CODE. ANN. § 5122.15 (West 2001 & Supp. 2008) (mandating the use of the least restrictive
form of therapy for a person subject to civil commitment, including mandatory outpatient care
or hospitalization followed by conditional release).
570Hio REV. CODE. ANN. § 5122.01 (West 2001 & Supp. 2008).
58§ 5122.15(F) (providing that a patient can be released from care when they no longer
satisfy the criteria for commitment by a clinician); OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 5122.231 (West
2001 & Supp. 2008) (providing that a patient has the right to request additional or different
services).
59 OHIo REV. CODE. ANN. § 5122.05 (West 2001 & Supp. 2008).
60OHio REV. CODE. ANN. § 5122.10 (West 2001 & Supp. 2008).
6 1OHIo REV. CODE. ANN. § 5122.11 (West 2001 & Supp. 2008).
62OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 5122.13 (West 2001 & Supp. 2008).
63OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 5122.141(B) (West 2001 & Supp. 2008).
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these needs; or (4) would benefit from treatment and need such treatment due to
behavior that creates a grave and imminent risk to the substantial rights of self or
others.' A full hearing is held within thirty days, at which time the person has the
right to counsel and can cross examine witnesses and present evidence.65 At the
hearing, if the court finds that the person is subject to civil commitment, the court
must order the respondent to be treated in the least restrictive environment, which
can include outpatient care if adequate to treat the needs of the patient.' At any time
during this process, a respondent can elect to voluntarily seek treatment, which
results in a complete dismissal of the case.67
An initial treatment order lasts ninety days and is renewable for up to two years.6"
If at any time the chief clinical officer determines that a patient no longer meets the
involuntary commitment standard and upon giving notice to the court, the patient
may be released from care or, if hospitalized, may be transferred to a less restrictive
setting, such as outpatient care.69 But a patient cannot be moved to a more restrictive
setting without a motion before the court showing that the respondent presents a
substantial risk of physical harm to himself or others.7" Additionally, a patient may
request supplementary or alternate services from the county mental health board at
any time.7
C. Jason's Law: Adding Assisted Outpatient Treatment to the State's Arsenal
Jason's Law will expand outpatient commitment in Ohio by incorporating a
preventative commitment model into existing law.7" The law will broaden the
criteria for commitment by eliminating the requirement for imminent danger to self
64OHiO REV. CODE. ANN. § 5122.01 (West 2001 & Supp. 2008).
65OHiO REV. CODE. ANN. § 5122.15 (West 2001 & Supp. 2008). Mental illness is defined
as "a substantial disorder of thought, mood, perception, orientation, or memory that grossly
impaired judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or ability to meet the ordinary
demands of life." § 5122.01(A).
66§ 5122.15(E).
67§ 5122.15(G)(1).
68§ 5122.15(H).
69A chief clinical officer is defined as "the medical director of a hospital, or a community
mental health agency, or a board of alcohol, drug addiction, and mental health services, or, if
there is no medical director, the licensed physician responsible for the treatment a hospital or
community mental health agency provides .... A licensed physician or licensed clinical
psychologist designated by the chief clinical officer may perform the duties and accept the
responsibilities of the chief clinical officer in the chief clinical officer's absence."
§ 5122.01 (K); § 5122.15(F). Stricter standards for release and transfer exist for persons found
incompetent to stand trial or not guilty by reason of insanity however this Note focuses
exclusively on non-criminal patients.
70OHiO REV. CODE. ANN. § 5122.20 (West 2001 & Supp. 2008).
7
'OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 5122.231 (West 2001 & Supp. 2008). Services that can be
requested include outpatient care, rehabilitation, residential services, job training, and
community support. OHio REV. CODE. ANN. § 340.09 (West 2001 & Supp. 2008).
72Schopp, supra note 26, at 34.
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or others and, thus, expand the number of individuals who can be committed.73 This
law will considerably alter the landscape of civil commitment in Ohio.
A preventative commitment model will significantly change the criteria,
procedures, and flexibility currently mandated by Ohio law. The proposed criteria
under Jason's Law are far less stringent and do not require a finding that a
respondent is presently, immediately, or imminently dangerous to self or others or
unable to make a rational treatment choice before a court can compel outpatient
care.74 Largely based on legislation in New York known as Kendra's Law, Jason's
Law would mandate outpatient treatment for: (1) adults; (2) suffering from mental
illness; (3) who are unlikely to survive safely in the community without supervision;
(4) who have a history of noncompliance with mental health treatment and whose
mental illness has been a significant factor in either (i) hospitalization or receipt of
related services at least twice in the past three years, or (ii) at least one act of serious
violent behavior, or threats or attempts thereof, toward self or others in the last four
years; (5) who are unlikely to voluntarily participate in treatment that would enable
them to live safely in the community; (6) who are in need of treatment to prevent
deterioration that would result in serious harm to self or others; and (7) who are
likely to benefit from outpatient treatment.
The proceedings would be initiated by an adult roommate, immediate relative,
current or previous mental health care provider, or probation or parole officer filing a
petition with the local probate court.76 The petition must be accompanied by an
affidavit of a mental health professional who is not the petitioner, certifying that the
respondent meets all of the criteria and that they have attempted to examine or have
personally examined the respondent. 77 Before a hearing, the mental health board
must draft a treatment plan and offer the respondent an opportunity to participate in
73H.R. 299, 127th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess., at 5-6 (Ohio 2007).
741d. (requiring instead that a respondent's mental illness have been a significant factor in
receiving treatment at least twice in the previous three years, excluding current care, or that
the respondent has harmed or threatened to harm self or others at least once in the past four
years). Therefore, under Jason's Law it is conceivable that someone who threatened suicide
more than three years prior and who is currently resistant to seeking mental health treatment
can be compelled to assisted outpatient treatment regardless of the fact that there is no proof of
imminent harm.
75See Rollenhagen, supra note 19; N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60 (McKinney 2006 &
Supp. 2008); Ohio H.R. 299 at 5-6.
76 Ohio H.R. 299 at 4.
77 d. A mental health professional is defined by the proposed law as any of the following:
a physician; a physician's assistant under the direction and control of a physician; a clinical
nurse specialist, certified nurse midwife, or certified nurse practitioner; a psychologist; a
professional clinical counselor, or professional counselor under supervision of a psychologist,
psychiatrist, professional clinical counselor, or independent social worker; an independent
social worker, or a social worker under the supervision of a psychologist, psychiatrist,
professional clinical counselor, independent social worker, or registered nurse with a master's
degree in psychiatric nursing; an independent marriage and family therapist, or a marriage and
family therapist under the supervision of a psychologist, psychiatrist, professional clinical
counselor, independent social worker, or independent marriage and family therapist. Id. at 2.
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the drafting of the plan. 8 A hearing must then be held within three days, at which
the respondent has a right to counsel and may present evidence. 9 If the court finds
by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent meets the criteria for treatment
and is satisfied with the proposed treatment plan, an initial six months of outpatient
treatment is ordered.8 ° At the end of the initial treatment period, the respondent's
progress is reviewed by the court and, if the court finds that further treatment is
warranted, it may order an additional period of treatment lasting up to one year.8 1 A
treatment provider cannot substantially change a treatment plan without the consent
of the respondent and the approval of the court."2 Any such change is subject to a
hearing if the respondent does not consent to the change. 83 If a respondent does not
voluntarily comply with the treatment order, the court may order the respondent to
inpatient hospitalization pursuant to existing civil commitment laws.
8 4
A brief comparison reveals several key changes Jason's Law will make to Ohio's
commitment laws. First, and probably most obvious, the element of dangerousness
is removed and replaced by a prediction of future harm. 85 Second, the definition of a
mental health professional under Jason's Law is significantly broader, encompassing
even family therapists and nurse midwives, in contrast to current law, which relies
upon the recommendation of a physician and psychiatrist or clinical psychologist,
and an investigation by the county's mental services board.86 Third, Jason's Law
reduces the frequency of required reviews of the respondent's condition and
lengthens the initial treatment period from three months to six months. 87 Fourth,
under Jason's Law, treatment providers must seek court approval to make any major
changes to a plan, whereas current law allows providers to release from care patients
that no longer meet the criteria for commitment.88 The legislature of Ohio should
781d. at 7.
79
1d.
81d. at 8.
8 1 id
81d. at 9.
831d. at 9-10.
"Id. at 10.
85Id. at 5; OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 5122.01 (West 2001 & Supp. 2008).
86Ohio H.R. 299 at 4; OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 5122.11 (West 2001 & Supp. 2008)
(providing that affidavit for judicial hospitalization be accompanied by accompanied by a
certificate signed by either a physiatrist or a clinical psychologist and a certificated signed by a
physician stating that the person has been examined or by a separate affidavit by the applicant
swearing that the respondent has refused to be examined by a psychiatrist or psychologist and
a physician); OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 5122.13 (West 2001 & Supp. 2008) (requiring that an
investigation be performed by the board of alcohol, drug addiction, and mental health services
or an agency designated by the board any time an affidavit is filed).
87OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 5122.21(F) (West 2001 & Supp. 2008) (requiring an
examination confirming the justification for continued commitment at least every 30 days);
Ohio H.R. 299.
88Ohio H.R. 299 at 9; OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 5122.15(F) (West 2001 & Supp. 2008).
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ensure that these changes are warranted by current case law, give adequate weight to
the rights of the individual, are supported by proof of effectiveness, and are
adequately funded.
III. JASON'S LAW'S CRITERIA FOR ASSISTED OUTPATIENT TREATMENT
Civil commitment constitutes a significant infringement of liberty that can only
be justified by a compelling state interest.s9 One commentator has observed that "it
is inaccurate to contend that persons subject to preventative commitment are entitled
to fewer protections because the infringement on their liberty is less than
hospitalization." 90 Persons subject to outpatient civil commitment, such as Jason's
Law proposes, can be told where to live, what medicines to take, and where and how
often they must report for therapy.9 The U.S. Supreme Court has observed that civil
commitment to a mental hospital "after a finding of probable dangerousness to self
or others" can have a stigmatizing effect.92 For example, one court has held that
court ordered outpatient treatment is the equivalent of commitment to a mental
institution. 93 Thus, preventative outpatient commitment can be just as stigmatizing
as institutionalization and those persons subjected to it should be guaranteed the
same protections afforded to those that are subjected to other forms of civil
commitment. Therefore, it is imperative that the state have valid reasons supported
by parens patria or police powers principles before imposing stigmatizing
constraints upon an individual.
A state is currently permitted to compel involuntary commitment and affect a
deprivation of liberty only when an individual is either presently or imminently
dangerous to self or others, thus implicating the state's police powers, or is incapable
of making a competent treatment decision, thus implicating the state's parens patria
powers.94  Conversely, Jason's Law requires neither a finding of present
dangerousness nor the inability to make a competent treatment choice before
89Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078,
1084 (E.D. Wis. 1972) ("The power of the state to deprive a person of the fundamental liberty
to go unimpeded about his or her affairs must rest on a consideration that society has a
compelling interest in such deprivation.").
90Susan Stefan, Preventative Commitment: The Concept and Its Pitfalls, 11 MENTAL &
PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 288,293 (1987).
91 Under Jason's Law,
assisted outpatient treatment means services provided pursuant to a court order.., that
include medication; periodic blood tests or urinalysis to determine compliance with
prescribed medication or the presence of alcohol or illegal drugs; individual or group
therapy; educational and vocational training or activities; supervision of living
arrangements; and any other services prescribed to treat a person's mental illness.
Ohio H.R. 299 at 1.
92Addington, 441 U.S. at 425.
93United States v. B.H., 466 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1149 (N.D. Iowa 2006). In B.H., the
Northern District of Iowa held that a respondent ordered to outpatient treatment was
"committed to a mental institution," and thus was barred by federal statute from owning
firearms. Id.
94 Id
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subjecting a person to potentially stigmatizing treatment.9" Instead, its criteria is
based on speculative risk assessments and does not require actual proof of imminent
danger; thus, a mentally ill person can be subject to an outpatient treatment order
simply for seeking treatment in the past and currently resisting treatment. 96 A patient
may choose to forego treatment for many complex reasons; it simply should not be
supposed that such a decision is based on incompetence or an inability to make
treatment decisions.97
According to the Supreme Court of Ohio, "[O]nly when a court finds that a
person is incompetent to make informed treatment decisions do we permit the state
to act in a paternalistic manner, making treatment decisions in the best interest of the
patient."9'  The criteria under Jason's Law, however, would have the effect of
requiring non-dangerous, competent persons to comply with court mandated
treatment. 99 This could occur if a treatment resistant person, having previously
sought voluntary treatment and having stopped such treatment for personal reasons,
but not having committed any violent acts or threats to self or others, is ordered to
accept treatment on the basis of a prediction of future risk.100 This effect has been
documented in New York where Kendra's Law requires substantially the same
criteria.0 1 Such criteria cannot be justified by the state's parens patria interests. 0 2
95See discussion supra note 69 and text of Section III.
96
"The Supreme Court has stated, albeit in dicta, that 'many psychiatric predictions of
dangerousness are inaccurate.' Yet, such predictions are offered-frequently in minimalist
ways that are subject to no meaningful cross-examination or challenge-daily in civil
commitment courts across the country." Michael L. Perlin, "Half- Wracked Prejudice Leaped
Forth ": Sanism, Pretextuality, and Why and How Mental Disability Law Developed as It Did,
10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL IssuEs 3, 21-22 (1999) (quoting Riggins v. Nevada., 504 U.S. 127,
133-34 (1992)).
97Steele v. Hamilton County Cmty. Mental Health Bd., 736 N.E.2d 10, 20 (Ohio 2000)
("[M]ental illness and incompetence are not one and the same."). A decision to not comply
may be more indicative of an aversion to medication side effects, than to a lack of competence
or an inability to make an informed treatment decision. Michael L. Perlin, Therapeutic
Jurisprudence and Outpatient Commitment Law: Kendra's Law as Case Study, 9 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL'Y & L. 183, 197 (2003).
98Perlin, supra note 97, at 188.
99The criteria for Jason's Law require an either/or finding of recent hospitalization or
similar treatment for a mental illness (twice in the past 48 months) or recent acts or threats of
violence (once in the last 36 months). H.R. 299, 127th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess., at 5-6 (Ohio
2007). Conceivably, persons who have never acted violently can be committed to outpatient
treatment based simply on prior treatment, voluntary or not, and a prediction that they will
become violent if left untreated.
1001d.
'
0
'According to the organization New York Lawyers For The Public Interest, Kendra's
Law "is used primarily against people who have had more than one psychiatric hospitalization
but no history of hurting others." New York Lawyers For The Public Interest, Implementation
of "Kendra 's Law" is Severely Biased, at 3, available at http://nylpi.org/pub/
Kendras_ Law_04-07-05.pdf. A study conducted by the state of New York confirms this,
finding that eighty-five percent of the more than 10,000 respondents subject to assisted
outpatient treatment orders between the years 1999 and 2004 had not caused physical harm to
another person during the four year period preceding their commitment. Id.
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But New York courts have upheld the validity of similar criteria, despite the absence
of an incapacity provision, because court ordered medication is not forcibly
administered.1"3 Critics contend, however, that coercion in the form of threatened
hospitalization, the consequence for noncompliance with a treatment plan, is akin to
forcibly medicating someone." It is difficult to see a meaningful difference
between forcibly administering a medication to someone and using a court order to
compel self-administration. In either instance, the state has removed the
respondent's ability to make a voluntary choice and, in the latter instance, it will
have done so without first finding the respondent incompetent to make such a choice.
Other states with statutes similar to Jason's Law require a court to find that the
respondent is unable to make a treatment choice before involuntary outpatient
treatment can be ordered. 5 These statutes are more in keeping with the principle of
102Schopp, supra note 26, at 36.
103Erin O'Connor, Note, Is Kendra's Law a Keeper?: How Kendra's Law Erodes
Fundamental Rights of the Mentally Ill, 11 J.L. & POL'y 313, 334-36 (2002) (citing In re
Urcuyo, 714 N.Y.S.2d 862, 865 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000); In re Martin, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 9, 2001, at
31 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 8, 2001)).
"40'Connor, supra note 103, at 347; see also LINHORST, supra note 17, at 47-48, 57.
Studies are conflicted as to whether coercion improves functioning of the severely mentally ill
or discourages voluntary participation in treatment. Marvin S. Swartz, et al., Does Coercion
Keep People Away from Mental Health Treatment?: Evidence from a Survey of Persons with
Schizophrenia and Mental Health Professionals, 21 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 459, 462 (2003). One
study conducted in California found that forty-seven percent of respondents "avoided
traditional mental health services for fear of being involuntarily committed." Id. Still another
study, found no "chilling effect of involuntary outpatient commitment on voluntary help-
seeking," suggesting that such an effect is more likely linked to inpatient commitment. Id. at
471.
05°States that require some form of diminished capacity to make a rational or informed
treatment decision before outpatient treatment can be compelled include Alabama, Arizona,
Arkansas, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, North
Carolina, New Hampshire, North Dakota, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, and Wisconsin. ALA.
CODE § 22-52-10.2 (LexisNexis 2006) ("the respondent is unable to make a rational and
informed decision as to whether or not treatment for mental illness would be desirable"); Aiuz.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-501(33)(b) (2003 & Supp. 2006) ("substantially impairs the person's
capacity to make an informed decision regarding treatment"); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-47-207(c)
(2002) ("the person's understanding of the need for treatment is impaired to the point that he
or she is unlikely to participate in treatment voluntarily"); GA. CODE ANN. § 37-3-1 (West,
Westlaw through 2007 Reg. Sess.) ("unable voluntarily to seek or comply with outpatient
treatment"); HAW. REv. STAT. § 334-121 (LexisNexis 2004) ("the person's current mental
status or the nature of the person's disorder limits or negates the person's ability to make an
informed decision to voluntarily seek or comply with recommended treatment"); IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 66-339A (repealed 2008) ("the person lacks capacity to make an informed decision
concerning his need for treatment"); IOWA CODE ANN. § 229.1(16) (West 2006 & Supp. 2007)
("lacks sufficient judgment to make responsible decisions with respect to the person's
hospitalization or treatment"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2946(f) (2005) ("lacks capacity to make
an informed decision concerning treatment"); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1401 (West
1999 & Supp. 2008) ("judgment is so impaired that he or she is unable to understand his or her
need for treatment"); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.065(5) (West 2007) ("the proposed patient,
when competent, would have chosen substantially similar treatment under the same
circumstances"); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 632.005(9) (West 2006) ("an impairment in his capacity
2008]
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parens patria, allowing a state to substitute its judgment only when the respondent is
unable to make a treatment decision. For example, Hawaii's criteria for assisted
outpatient commitment requires that the respondent's "disorder limits or negates the
person's ability to make an informed decision to voluntarily seek or comply with
recommended treatment."'" Hawaii's outpatient commitment law goes even further
in protecting the rights of the individual by specifically forbidding physical restraint
and forcible medication and providing that a refusal to accept treatment may not be
used as evidence against the respondent in a proceeding for involuntary
hospitalization. '07
The one exception to the incompetence rule is when the state's police power is
applicable. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that absent present dangerousness, a
finding of mental illness alone does not justify state compelled treatment.' Rather,
the state's police power is implicated only when a respondent presents "an imminent
threat of harm" to self or others."° One of the sponsors of Jason's Law contends that
the law will only apply to "[a] small segment of folks ... who are prone to become
violent" when left un-medicated."0 But the Ohio Supreme Court has held that, "[t]he
police power may not be asserted broadly to justify keeping patients on antipsychotic
drugs to keep them docile, thereby avoiding potential violence.' Furthermore, the
to make decisions with respect to his hospitalization and need for treatment"); N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 135-C:27 (2006) ("lacks the capacity to care for his own welfare"); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 122C-271(a) (2005) ("nature of his illness limits or negates his ability to make an
informed decision to seek voluntarily or comply with recommended treatment"); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 25-03.1-02(12) (2002 & Supp. 2005) ("effect of the person's mental condition on the
person's ability to consent"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-17-580 (2002 & Supp. 2006) ("lacks
sufficient insight or capacity to make responsible decisions with respect to his treatment");
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 574.035 (Vernon 2003 & Supp. 2008) ("specific
characteristics of the proposed patient's clinical condition that make impossible a rational and
informed decision whether to submit to voluntary outpatient treatment"); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 62A-15-631 (2006) ("the patient lacks the ability to engage in a rational decision-making
process regarding the acceptance of mental treatment"); WIS. STAT. § 51.20(l)(a)(2)(e) (West
2003 & Supp. 2006) ("incapability of expressing an understanding of the advantages and
disadvantages of accepting medication or treatment and the alternatives").
106HAw. REv. STAT. § 334-121 (LexisNexis 2004).
'
0 7HAw. REv. STAT. § 334-129(b), (c) (LexisNexis 2004).
10 8See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975) ("[T]here is no constitutional
basis for confining such persons involuntarily if they are dangerous to no one and can live
safely in freedom .... [T]he mere presence of mental illness does not disqualify a person
from preferring his home to the comforts of an institution .... Mere public intolerance or
animosity cannot constitutionally justify the deprivation of a person's physical liberty.")
(emphasis added). Likewise, fear of potential violence as opposed to present dangerousness
should not be used to justify compelling a competent person to seek outpatient treatment, thus
depriving him or her of medical liberty.
'°9Steele v. Hamilton County Cmty. Mental Health Bd., 736 N.E.2d 10, 18 (Ohio 2000).
"°Regarding Assisted Outpatient Treatment: Hearing on H.B. 299 Before the H. Comm.
on Health, 127th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2007) (statement of Rep. Tom Patton,
primary sponsor of Ohio H.R. 299).
"'Steele, 736 N.E.2d at 18 (emphasis added).
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court applies a totality of circumstances test to determine whether a person should be
subjected to court ordered treatment and considers such factors as "whether.. .the
individual currently represents a substantial risk of physical harm to himself or other
members of society" and any "past history [which demonstrates] the individual's
degree of conformity to the laws, rules, regulations and values of society.""' 2 The
evidence required includes the opinion of the treating physician and concrete facts
that demonstrate that the respondent is in need of compulsory treatment."
3
As written, the proposed law is overbroad, ambiguous, and does not specifically
identify "the features and dimensions that distinguish [the mentally disordered] who
act violently from the majority who do not."'  Instead, outpatient civil commitment
under Jason's Law would be based on a prediction that a person is unlikely to
survive safely in the community without treatment and would likely harm themselves
or others if left untreated.' Such predictions should not be based on generalized
assumptions that the mentally ill behave more violently than the general public.
According to several recent studies, the majority of mentally disordered individuals
are not prone to violence." 6 It has been proven that other risk factors are much more
significant predictors of future violence than mental illness alone." 7 For instance,
one study found that drug abuse and "specific clinical risk factors" present within a
minority of the mentally ill, such as "paranoid, narcissistic, and passive-aggressive
personality disorders," have a higher correlation with violence than general
diagnoses of mental illness." 8 However, one researcher has cautioned that, until
clinicians can accurately identify these risk factors, lowering the threshold for civil
commitment-by eliminating the imminent danger requirement-is unwarranted." 9
The justification for Jason's Law, either under the police or parens patria
powers, is tenuous at best. The goal of preventing violence is valid, but merely
"[r]elating to persons as if they represent a violence threat simply because of their
1121n re Burton, 464 N.E.2d 530, 534 (Ohio 1984).
"'in re Miller, 585 N.E.2d 396, 402 (Ohio 1992).
114Paul G. Nestor, Mental Disorder and Violence: Personality Dimensions and Clinical
Features, 159 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1973, 1977 (2002).
"'H.R. 299, 127th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess., at 5-6 (Ohio 2007).
"16Substance Abuse & Mental Health Services Administration: Understanding Mental
Illness, Violence and Mental Illness: The Facts, http://www.samhsa.gov/MentalHealth/
understandingMentalllnessFactsheet.aspx; Monahan, supra note 18, at 519 ("By all
indications, the great majority of people who are currently disordered-approximately
90%. . .- are not violent."); Friedman, supra note 18, at 2065 ("[B]ecause serious mental
illness is quite rare, it actually contributes very little to the overall rate of violence in the
general population; the attributable risk has been estimated to be 3 to 5%.").
1"7Nestor, supra note 114, at 1973-74.
1"8 See id. According to Nestor, rates of violence among substance abusers are twelve to
sixteen times higher than the average person compared to only five times higher for those
suffering from mental illness. Id. at 1974.
"1gFriedman, supra note 18, at 2066.
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history of illness or hospitalization represents a grave personal injustice."'2 ° Should
it become law, courts interpreting Jason's Law must be careful to guard against
reliance on "general statement[s] of what a patient with [a particular] disorder could
experience" as proof of a substantial risk of harm to self or others.'2' Due
consideration must also be given to the circumstances surrounding any incidence of
violence or threats of violence, such as at whom the act was directed and whether a
sufficient explanation existed for the behavior.'22
Both Jason's Law and current Ohio law can compel outpatient treatment;
however, Jason's Law proposes to restrict a patient's liberty under far less stringent
criteria than are currently supported by relevant case law.'23  At a minimum,
predictions of violence should be based on the individual's immediate past history of
violence or threats of violence rather than extending this period back four years.
Moreover, such predictions must not be based on generalized data about a particular
mental illness, but should be based upon individualized risk factors. In order to
address these pitfalls, the text of Jason's Law must require the state to prove that the
respondent has previously sought treatment and has either recently threatened or
acted violently toward self or others or is presently suffering from a substance abuse
problem, thus justifying the statute under the police power.'24 Alternatively, Jason's
Law could require a finding that the respondent is unable to make an informed
treatment decision. Other states' outpatient commitment statutes require that a
person be unable to make a rational treatment choice before treatment can be
compelled. 2 ' In effect, such a finding could substitute for the lack of a
dangerousness standard in Jason's Law and would constitute a parens patria
justification. Either outcome would be more supportable under case precedent than
the standard as currently written.
IV. THE INFLEXIBILITY OF TREATMENT PLANS UNDER JASON'S LAW
The right to determine the course of one's health treatment is constitutionally
protected and, according to the Supreme Court of Ohio, is a fundamental and natural
120Bruce G. Link & Ann Stueve, Psychotic Symptoms and the Violent/Illegal Behavior of
Mental Patients Compared to Community Controls, in VIOLENCE & MENTAL DISORDER 137,
156 (John Monahan & Henry J. Steadman eds., 1994).
rain re 1.K., 663 N.W.2d 197, 203 (N.D. 2003) (holding that testimony to establish proof
of a substantial risk of harm must be based on evidence specific to the individual and not
based upon generalized statements of typical risks associated with any one particular
disorder).
122See In re Mental Illness of Thomas, 671 N.E.2d 616, 621 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (finding
a single homicidal threat made six months prior to the filing of a petition for involuntary
hospitalization insufficient to establish proof of imminent danger when threat was directed at
estranged husband during the course of a heated argument).
123See Steele v. Hamilton County Cmty. Mental Health Bd., 736 N.E.2d 10, 10 (Ohio
2000).
124Thus, criterion three would require that a patient have been hospitalized or treated for
their mental illness at least twice in the last four years, and have engaged in one or more acts
or threats of violence in the last three years.
125See discussion, supra note 105.
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right. "'26 Inherent in this right is the liberty to refuse medical treatment, particularly
unwanted medications.22 Accordingly, treatment decisions, particularly those
regarding medication, are regarded as the province of the doctor-patient relationship
and should be given great deference by the courts. 21 Current Ohio civil commitment
law is mindful of a patient's medical liberties by ensuring that patients participate in
the drafting of treatment plans and requiring that such participation is documented,
by requiring that patients are given notice of the right to refuse unnecessary or
excessive medication, and by keeping treatment plans flexible to meet the changing
needs of the patient.'29
The passage of Jason's Law would place greater restrictions on the medical
liberties of the potentially dangerous individual than current law places on the
presently dangerous individual.' This result is irrational. If the criteria for
outpatient commitment are to be broadened to include even those respondents who
are not presently dangerous, then treatment flexibility should remain at current levels
or be broader itself. It makes no sense to give non-dangerous individuals less
influence over the course of their treatment than current law permits the imminently
dangerous. Thus, Jason's Law must give more control to the treating physician with
proper consideration for the patient's ability to competently choose the course of
treatment.
Ohio civil commitment law requires documentation that patients have actively
participated in drafting treatment plans and that these plans set reasonable objectives
and goals for the respondent.' Jason's Law, in contrast, does not require any
documented proof that a respondent has participated in the drafting of the plan.
Instead, all that is required is that the respondent be given an opportunity to
participate. 32 The county board of mental health would be required to draft a plan
126Cruzan v. Dir. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990); Steele, 736 N.E.2d at 15
("The right to refuse medical treatment is a fundamental right in our country, where personal
security, bodily integrity, and autonomy are cherished liberties. These liberties are not created
by statute or case law .... Our belief in the principle that '[e]very human being of adult years
and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body'... is reflected
in our decisions.") (citing Schloendorff v. Soc. of New York Hosp., 103 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y.
1914)); Nickell v. Gonzalez, 477 N.E.2d 1145 (Ohio 1985).
'
27Nickell, 477 N.E.2d 1145; Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221 (1990).
2
'Steele, 736 N.E.2d at 18; In re Burton, 464 N.E.2d 530, 536 (Ohio 1984).
129 0Hio REv. CODE. ANN. § 5122.01 (V) (West, Westlaw through 2007 File 32 of the 127th
GA) ("The active participation of the patient in establishing the objectives and goals shall be
documented"); See OHIO REv. CODE. ANN. § 5122.27(D)(6) (West 2006 & Supp. 2008) ("the
right to be free from unnecessary or excessive medication"); § 5122.27(D) (requiring
"periodic reevaluations of the treatment plan by the professional staff at intervals not to exceed
ninety days").
'
30This result occurs because Jason's Law does not permit a clinician to substantially
change a plan without court approval or release a patient once they no longer satisfy the
criteria as provided by current Ohio commitment law. H.R. 299, 127th Gen. Assem., Reg.
Sess., at 7 (Ohio 2007).
.
3
.§ 5122.01 (V).
"'1Ohio H.R. 299 at 7.
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within two days of receipt of court notice. 3 3 Two days is very little time to draft a
meaningful plan that includes individualized goals or objectives, or to ensure
participation by the respondent in its drafting. 34  Such a small window of
opportunity does not take into account the possibilities that a respondent may be
homeless and, thus, lacking access to reliable transportation or traditional modes of
communication. The result could be that a patient has had no input into the drafting
of his or her own treatment plan. This result would be particularly unreasonable if
the plan required the participant to take medications with potentially dangerous side
effects.
Jason's Law would further restrict the respondent's medical liberties by limiting
the treatment provider's ability to change a treatment plan. Under current law, a
chief clinical officer is only required to file a motion with the court if application of
more restrictive treatment is desired, such as movement from an outpatient setting to
hospitalization. 35 A hearing will be held only if the patient objects to the change.'36
Any change to less restrictive treatment requires only that notice be given to the
court; it does not require a hearing.'37 Upon receiving notice of the change, the court
can confirm the change or dismiss the case entirely.'38 For instance, if a respondent
reacts poorly to medication and talk therapy would be just as effective at
accomplishing the treatment goals, then a provider can proceed with the least
restrictive treatment. Additionally, the standards of care under Ohio law require that
all committed patients "receive periodic reevaluations of the [court ordered]
treatment plan by the professional staff' at least once every ninety days. 39
In contrast, Jason's Law requires that a treatment provider first petition the court
before making any substantive change to a treatment plan, defined as "any addition,
deletion, or amendment .. .that would affect the mental health of the assisted
outpatient," and requires that the court give notice of the petition to change the plan
to the original petitioner and any adult living with the respondent. 4 ° The court may
approve the change as long as the patient does not object, but if any of the notified
parties objects, then a hearing must be held within five business days. 4 ' The absurd
result is that patients could be compelled to adhere to medication orders despite
unwanted side effects or else face judicial hospitalization while awaiting the court's
approval of the doctor's treatment recommendations. Even more illogically, the
1331d.
134Perlin, supra note 99, at 197 (2003). As Perlin points out, persons not already in the
care of the state or a physician are more difficult to locate. Id.
'35OHio REV. CODE. ANN. § 5122.20 (West 2001 & Supp. 2008).
1
36
1d
"
1
37OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 5122.15(F) (West 2001 & Supp. 2008). Again, the procedures
differ for those that have been referred for involuntary services pursuant to a criminal charge,
and are either incompetent to stand trial or not guilty by reason of insanity.
1381d.
139 OHIo REV. CODE. ANN. § 5122.27(D) (West 2001 & Supp. 2008).
140H.R. 299, 127th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess., at 3, 9 (Ohio 2007).
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proposed law would allow third parties to overrule medical decisions made by
trained providers. Once again, the proposed law is more restrictive of a patient's
rights than current law, despite the fact that the patient is not presently dangerous or
incompetent.
Lastly, present law allows a chief medical officer to immediately release a patient
from involuntary treatment if, at any time, the patient no longer meets the criteria for
civil commitment.'42 The law provides for an initial treatment order of ninety days,
with an examination required every thirty days to confirm that continued
commitment is necessary. 4 3 Unreasonably, Jason's Law would not compel the same
frequency of review despite being based on even more lenient criteria, mandating
instead that the respondent be treated for an initial period of up to six months, with
the first review occurring at the end of that period.'" Further, at the end of the initial
treatment period, the plan can be renewed for a period up to one year, without
another review until the end of that year.'45 The only presumable relief would be for
the patient to file an appeal, which conceivably could take longer to litigate than the
six month treatment period. In effect, imminently dangerous respondents are
provided with greater procedural reviews under current law than Jason's Law would
grant to those who are merely predicted to become dangerous.
To reconcile these conflicts with present law, Jason's Law should be amended to
grant, at the very least, the same protections offered under current law. First, the law
should require documented proof that the respondent has participated in drafting the
treatment plan. This may be achieved by requiring a continuance of the hearing if
the court finds that the respondent has not participated in the treatment planning due
to time constraints or inadequate notice. Second, providers should be able to change
treatment plans to fit the needs of the patient without cumbersome procedural
hurdles. Thus, a hearing should be required only if the respondent objects to the
change, not if third parties outside of the doctor-patient relationship do not approve.
Additionally, the bill should be amended to grant respondents the ability to petition
for reasonable amendment or termination of their treatment plans.'" Finally,
'
42OH1o REV. CODE. ANN. § 5122.21(B) (West 2001 & Supp. 2008) ("After a finding...
that a person is a mentally ill person subject to hospitalization by court order, the chief clinical
officer or the hospital or agency to which the person is ordered ... may. . . grant a discharge
without the consent or authorization of any court."); OH-io REV. CODE. ANN. § 5122.19 (West
2001 & Supp. 2008) (requiring an examination of every person subject to involuntary
commitment within twenty-four hours of admission, to a hospital or community mental health
agency, certifying that the person meets the criteria for civil commitment, and requiring
immediate release if the person does not meet the criteria).
'
43OHIo REV. CODE. ANN. § 5122.15(C) (West 2001 & Supp. 2008) (limiting an initial
treatment order to ninety days); § 5122.21(A) (requiring an examination confirming the
justification for continued commitment at least every thirty days).
'44Ohio H.R. 299 at 8.
1451d.
146Any person committed under current state law "may, at any time, apply to the board of
alcohol, drug addiction, and mental health services serving his county of residence for services
listed in O.R.C. § 340.09." OHIo REV. CODE. ANN. § 5122.231 (West 2001 & Supp. 2008).
The services listed include outpatient care, residential housing, and community support. OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 340.09 (West 2001 & Supp. 2008).
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medical judgment and competent treatment choices should be given greater
deference; thus, a provider's ability to discharge under current law should be retained
and the frequency of review should mirror current state law-at least every ninety
days.
V. COMPELLED MEDICATION AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFUSAL
A reasonable inference can be drawn that Jason's Law would be focused on
compelling medication. The statutory definition of assisted outpatient treatment
evidences this intent by defining such treatment first and foremost as "services
provided pursuant to a court order that include medication [and] periodic blood tests
or urinalysis to determine compliance with prescribed medication."' 47 Data from the
state of New York, where Kendra's Law largely parallels the proposed Jason's Law,
indicates that eighty-eight percent of respondents subjected to assisted outpatient
treatment orders there are required to take medication.'48 Additionally, the chief
sponsor of Jason's Law has stated that a respondent who is "supposed to be on
medication [that] elects not to take them" endangers self and others.'49 But under
Ohio law, the civilly committed retain the right to be free from unnecessary or
excessive medication and may only be forcibly medicated pursuant to a finding of
imminent danger or incompetence. 50 Jason's Law guarantees no such right. Instead,
it threatens respondents with hospitalization for noncompliance with medication
orders. 5'
Jason's Law proposes compelling medication in the interest of protecting society
or the individual from potential harm.'52 New York courts interpreting Kendra's
Law have thus far held that this is a substantial enough interest to justify ordering the
respondent to take medications.' These courts draw a distinction between physical,
forcible medication and court compelled self-medication.'54 Force is defined as
"power, violence, or pressure directed against a person or thing" or as "[compelling]
by physical means or by legal requirement."'55 Force is "not necessarily confined to
'
47Ohio H.R. 299 at 1.
148NEw YORK STATE OFFICE OF MENTAL HEALTH, FINAL REPORT ON THE STATUS OF
ASSISTED OUTPATIENT TREATMENT 11 (2005), available at http://www.omh.state.ny.us/
omhweb/kendra%5Fweb/finalreport/.
'
49Rollenhagen, supra note 19. The title of Rollenhagen's article alone (Statehouse Bill
Could Force Drugs on Mentally Ill) is indicative of the demand for forced medication. See
also Spector, supra note 10; Editorial, Jason's Law Requiring Mentally Ill People to Take
Their Medications Would Be a Benefit to All Ohioans, Not an Unfair Imposition, PLAIN
DEALER (Cleveland), June 3, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 10437106.
150OHio REV. CODE. ANN. § 5122.27(D)(6) (West 2001 & Supp. 2008); Steele v. Hamilton
County Cmty. Mental Health Bd., 736 N.E.2d 10, 18-20 (Ohio 2000).
5
'H.R. 299, at 7.
152A prediction of danger under Jason's Law does not statutorily require proof of current
or prior violent behavior. Id.
1530'Connor, supra note 103, at 334-36; In re K.L., 806 N.E.2d 480, 485-86 (2004)
"% re K.L., 806 N.E.2d at 486.
'
55BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 673 (8th ed. 2004) (emphasis added).
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a physical manifestation; there may be an exertion of force through the practice of a
deceit."' 56 Under Jason's Law, respondents will be led to believe that they will be
hospitalized based simply on a refusal to comply with medication orders, while in
reality the higher standards of imminent danger to self or others or incompetence
would still need to be proven prior to involuntary hospitalization.'57 Thus, the
distinction between forcible medication and court ordered medication is unfounded
because most patients will feel forced to comply with a court order to take compelled
medication rather than risk being hospitalized for noncompliance. 58
Research has demonstrated that psychotropic medications pose dangerous, even
fatal risks to a patient, while conferring only a minimal benefit.'59 The risks of
psychiatric medications are well documented and can include severe, and sometimes
irreversible, neurological disorders and, in rare instances, even death. 60 Moreover, a
considerable minority of the mentally ill do not benefit at all from medication, and
any benefits that are conferred are short in duration.'6' One recent study revealed
that two of the most commonly prescribed antipsychotic medications, Risperdal and
Haldol, used to reduce aggression in the mentally disabled, were found to be no more
effective than a placebo, leading the researchers to conclude that this type of
treatment "should no longer be regarded as a satisfactory form of care."' 62 Other
research has shown that "long-term drug treatment may impair memory, reasoning
ability, mental speed, learning capacity, and efficiency of mental functioning in
general."' 63 In addition to having lasting effects on the brain, another of the more
commonly used drugs, Zyprexa, was recently revealed to be a substantial factor
leading to significant weight gain and diabetes."6 Due to the numerous side effects,
156BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 485 (3d ed. 1969).
1570ne commentator observed that "[pireventative commitment then operates as a kind of
judicial intimidation, which can only work if the respondent mistakenly assumes that the
judge's order must be obeyed" to avoid inpatient treatment. Stefan, supra note 90, at 294-95.
158See Stefan, supra note 90, at 294-95.
159 WINICK, supra note 38, at 70-76.
160See id.; Steele v. Hamilton County Cmty. Mental Health Bd., 736 N.E.2d 10, 16-17
(Ohio 2000); Dennis E. Cichon, The Right to 'Just Say No': A History and Analysis of the
Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Drugs, 53 LA. L. REv. 283, 297-310 (1992); Sheldon Gelman,
Looking Backward: The Twentieth Century Revolutions in Psychiatry, Law, and Public
Mental Health, 29 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 531, 535-36 (2003).
161WINICK, supra note 38, at 75; Gelman, supra note 160, at 533-35.
162Benedict Carey, Drugs Offer No Benefit in Curbing Aggression, Study Finds, N.Y.
TIMES, at Al 1 ("The new study tracked 86 adults with low I.Q.'s in community housing in
England, Wales and Australia over more than a month of treatment. It found a 79 percent
reduction in aggressive behavior among those taking dummy pills, compared with a reduction
of 65 percent or less in those taking antipsychotic drugs.").
163 WINICK, supra note 38, at 75.
'64Alex Berenson, Lilly Adds Strong Warning Label to Zyprexa, a Schizophrenia Drug,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2007, at C3 (discussing the apparent twelve year cover-up by drug maker
Eli Lilly of the detrimental physical effects of Zyprexa, one of the most commonly prescribed
drugs for schizophrenia or bipolar disorder). "One in six patients who take Zyprexa will gain
more than thirty-three pounds after two years of use." Id.
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"[w]hether the potential benefits [of medication] are worth the risks is a personal
decision that, in the absence of a compelling state interest, should be free from
government intrusion." '
In light of the risks and minimal benefits of medication, the patient's and
physician's views should be given the greatest deference, unless the patient lacks the
competency to make a rational treatment choice or poses an imminent danger to self
or others."6 These are the rights currently guaranteed under Ohio law; it makes no
sense to limit these rights just because the patient is not being physically restrained
when medication is administered. Jason's Law should require that respondents be
fully advised of their right to refuse medication and when this right can be
overridden. Rather than using coercive threats, the state should seek to form a
cooperative relationship with patients, giving full respect for their wishes, until such
time as they are no longer able to make rational choices or become an imminent
danger to self or others.
The use of advanced directives could be a way of fostering cooperation and
respect for involuntary patients. An advanced directive is a written instrument
drafted during a period of competency in which an individual expresses how future
health care needs should be addressed during a period of incompetency. 67 Just as in
right to die cases, such an instrument would prevail over the state's parens patria
interests in compelling treatment. 168 However, should an individual not only become
incompetent but dangerous as well, the state's police power would override any
previously expressed desires of the patient.'69 In this respect, the state's ultimate
purpose of promoting public health and safety would not be frustrated by the use of
such a document.
If Jason's Law is to be enacted in Ohio, the state must make certain that
respondents truly understand their rights to refuse medication.'7" Because
psychotropic medications have the potential for serious side effects and may not
even be effective at preventing violence, the state must not focus too heavily on
medication alone. Therefore, an effort should be made early in any commitment
process to secure advanced directives from competent patients so that their wishes
can be respected should they become incompetent. The courts and treatment
providers must be encouraged to use the full range of services mandated by the
proposed law, including housing assistance, job training, and therapy, to encourage
empowerment of the mentally ill rather than simply resorting to coerced medication.
165Steele v. Hamilton County Cmty. Mental Health Bd., 736 N.E.2d 10, 17 (Ohio 2000).
166Winick makes reference to quarantine and epidemics where compulsory treatment or
vaccination is justified by public health concerns. WINICK, supra note 38, at 394 (citing
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (holding that the state's police power interest
in preventing small pox epidemic outweighed a competent individuals right to refuse
vaccination)).
167WINICK, supra note 38, at 392.
101d. at 394.
170See Cruzan v. Dir. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990).
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VI. OHIO'S LACK OF SUFFICIENT FUNDING TO SUPPORT JASON'S LAW
As with any public health measure, the Ohio legislature must give due
consideration to the availability of funds and services necessary to implement
Jason's Law. The effectiveness and proper application of involuntary outpatient
commitment depends upon there being adequate resources and facilities to ensure the
"highest quality mental health care."17' These concerns are particularly relevant in
light of a report released in 2004 by the Ohio Department of Mental Health (ODMH)
detailing the 'crisis' facing Ohio's acute mental health care delivery system.'
According to the report, Ohio's mental health system has been plagued by
insufficient funding and a limited availability of services while simultaneously
experiencing an increase in demand.'73 Against this backdrop, the Ohio legislature
must ask whether implementation of Jason's Law is realistically feasible.
Ohio's spending on mental health care has steadily declined since 1997, from
roughly $325 million to $225 million. 74 As overall funding has decreased, the state
has increasingly shifted the majority of its mental health care dollars from inpatient
care to community care, slashing the number of public hospital inpatient beds by
twenty-one percent between 1997 and 2002 from 1444 to a measly 1146 statewide.'75
These budgetary cuts, coupled with growing demand, have left the state unable to
properly address the needs of the mentally ill, leading ODMH to observe that "[t]he
decline in state funding has eroded the community's capacity to provide quality
care."
176
This "erosion" is characterized by long waiting periods for care, overburdened
providers, and insufficient staffing to meet public demand. 77 According to a 1999
report by the Surgeon General, lack of services is an organizational barrier which
17'See, e.g., AM. Ass'N CMTY. PSYCHIATRISTS, supra note 55; AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N,
MANDATORY OUTPATIENT TREATMENT RESOURCE DOCUMENT 11-12 (1999), available at
www.psych.org/edu/otherres/libarchives/archives/199907.pdf ("[T]he history of de-
institutionalization has not provided reassurance that these resources will be forthcoming.").
A study of eight states with some form of involuntary outpatient commitment found several
implementation problems, including inconsistent application from county to county, difficulty
monitoring treatment, a shortage of means to take non compliant respondents to hospital for
reexamination, and limited availability of treatment services. Petrila, supra note 15, at 167-68.
172OHIO DEP'T OF MENTAL HEALTH, THE CRISIS IN OHIO'S ACUTE MENTAL HEALTH CARE:
A MENTAL HEALTH AND OVERALL HEALTH PROBLEM (2004), available at
http://www.mh.state.oh.us/medicaldirdiv/documents/acutecare.report.pdf
1731d
'
741d. at 11.
1751d. at 5. Amongst private hospitals, the availability of beds is just as limited, with the
number of beds decreasing during the same time period by thirteen percent from 3456 beds to
2842 beds. Id.
176Id. at 11. See also id. at 19. Thus far, private insurance companies have not stepped up
to fill the void as evidenced by their increasing refusal to reimburse for psychiatric care and
subsequent closures of inpatient facilities. Id. at 12.
1771d at 16-17.
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deters individuals from seeking help. 7 ' In Ohio, patients must wait from forty-five
to ninety days for outpatient services.' 79 And in Cuyahoga County, which has the
highest rate of mental illness in Ohio and is where Timothy Halton was from,
roughly 500 mental health and retardation cases are assigned to meet weekly with a
mere six probation officers. 8 Officials there have already debated the value of
having a preventative outpatient commitment program, but concluded that the county
mental health board simply could not afford such a program.' The difficulties
facing urban counties, such as Cuyahoga, are magnified in rural counties, where the
ratio of psychiatrists or psychiatric nurses to the general population ranges from zero
to one for every 20,000 residents.8 2
All of these deficiencies become even more compelling when one looks at the
statewide growth in demand for mental health services. Demand for "outpatient
crisis intervention services" in Ohio swelled by a whopping sixty-two percent in
three short years between 2000 and 2003, from 29,000 persons requesting care to
46,500.'83 The growth in demand can also be attributed to growth of the Medicaid
state, with ODMH observing that the large amount of Medicaid eligible consumers
has caused providers to deny access to non-Medicaid eligible consumers shifting the
demand to the criminal justice system, family, and emergency departments.
8 4
Should Jason's Law be enacted, it can be rationally predicted that these numbers will
swell even more with the courts having to sift through those that meet the proposed
criteria for outpatient commitment and those who do not. This will inevitably use
178See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE
SURGEON GENERAL-EXECUTIVE SUMMARY at vii, xvi, xviii, xix-xx (1999), available at
http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/reports.htm.
179 OH10 DEP'T OF MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 172, at 16. "Over half of Ohio mental
health boards report that consumers can wait up to 45 working days to access outpatient
psychiatric services. An additional nine boards reported consumers must wait up to 60
working days for services, while eight boards reported wait times of up to 90 days or more."
Id.
180Harlan Spector, Halton Brings Attention to Mandatory Treatment, PLAIN DEALER
(Cleveland), July 14, 2007, at A l (citing a study finding Cuyahoga County to have the highest
rate of mental illness in Ohio); Dissell, et al., supra note 3 (discussing the lack of funding and
frustration felt by criminal justice officials charged with supervising the mentally ill).
81Spector, supra note 180. The county mental health board budget last year was $118
million. Id. Yet, in 2004, the county mental health board asked for a mere $250,000 to fund a
pilot program to create "a team to monitor 30 'frequent fliers'-severely mentally ill
individuals with histories of relapse and repeat hospitalizations," but the proposal and another
one like it proposed recently were both scrapped due to a lack of funding. Id.
182OHIO DEP'T OF MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 172, at 14. The shortage of mental health
professionals in rural areas was recently documented by the President's New Freedom
Commission on Mental Health, which found that greater than eighty-five percent of the areas
designated as mental health professional shortage areas by the federal government were rural.
NEW FREEDOM COMM'N ON MENTAL HEALTH, SUBCOMM. ON RURAL ISSUES: BACKGROUND
PAPER, DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., Pub. No. SMA-04-3890, at 11 (2004), available
at http://www.mentalhealthcommission.gov/papers/Rural.pdf.
18 3OHIO DEP'T OF MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 172, at 19.
l'Id. at 11-12.
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more resources and energy than the system can currently support. For example, in
New York where Kendra's Law was enacted in 2000, one observer noted that during
its initial four years of application only about one out of every four of the more than
7,000 petitions investigated resulted in an order for assisted outpatient treatment,
leading the author to conclude that Kendra's Law was a waste of "expensive
investigative and judicial resources."' 85
At this time, Ohio simply does not have the resources to spare such a large
undertaking as Jason's Law proposes without substantial increases in funding; yet,
Jason's Law carries with it no appropriation for separate funds.'86 If the state is to
compel persons to treatment, it should at a minimum be able to deliver on its promise
of treatment. The new model would require every county's participation, yet rural
counties forced to comply with the state mandate will be ill equipped to deal with the
increased case loads.8 7 Insufficient staffing and funding for such a program in these
areas is likely to lead to medication orders absent any other form of "high[] quality
mental health care," such as talk therapy, or necessary services, such as housing or
job assistance.'88 Implementation of this program also risks increased rationing of
services over and above what is already caused by Medicaid demand, whereby those
that voluntarily seek treatment will face even longer waits due to increased demand
from involuntary consumers. And in terms of enforcement, the threat of
hospitalization as a consequence for noncompliance may prove utterly unrealistic
given the fact that there simply are not enough beds to go around.'89 Therefore,
either Jason's Law should be amended to include adequate funding or it should be
relegated to the legislative waste bin in lieu of a real overall increase in mental health
care funding rather than simply allotting a larger piece of an ever-shrinking pie to
community services.
VII. CONCLUSION
Returning to the case of Timothy Halton, Jason's Law may have been able to
provide him with the treatment he needed, but its breadth would unnecessarily
infringe upon the rights of the non-dangerous mentally ill. Jason's Law, and others
like it, unduly restricts the liberty of the non-dangerous mentally ill without
substantial legal or moral justification by casting a net that is far wider than
necessary. Jason's Law conflicts with established Ohio civil commitment statutes
1850'Connor, supra note 103, at 361-62. O'Connor questions the effectiveness of
Kendra's Law at preventing violence in light of two recent horrific events. Id. at 365-66. One
man desperate for treatment pushed a woman in front of a subway train and another man
ordered to assisted outpatient treatment, but whose case was closed because the county lacked
the manpower to locate him, walked into a church service and opened fire, killing the priest
and a worshiper. Id. In light of these incidents, preventative commitment's promise of
preventing violence is an empty one.
'
86See H.R. 299, 127th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2007).
187See id.
188AM. Ass'N OF CMTY. PSYCHIATRISTS, supra note 55.
189See Omo DEP'T OF MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 172, at 6. "On average, the daily
occupancy rate was 91 percent across all nine state hospital sites during the second quarter of
2004." Id.
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and case law by basing its criteria in unproven assumptions and faulty risk
predictions and by unnecessarily interfering with the medical decisions of competent
persons and their doctors. If Jason's Law is to become law in Ohio, it must undergo
substantial changes and provide substantially the same rights and protections as
current Ohio law grants the mentally ill and must be adequately funded to provide a
full range of services across the state.
In the interest of preventing violence, it may make sense to eliminate the
imminent dangerousness requirement, but Jason's Law goes too far by not requiring
proof that the respondent has ever even threatened to harm self or others. Merely
determining that a person is suffering from a mental illness, has been treated or
hospitalized in the past, and has discontinued such treatment does not warrant
intrusion by the state.
In our haste to act, we must remember that the majority of the mentally ill are not
violent.19 Jason's Law should be more narrowly tailored to apply only to those
persons that have a history of violence as demonstrated by evidence of violent acts or
threats, but who may not be presently dangerous, such as Timothy Halton. But, as
written, the law could easily apply to someone who has never acted violently, simply
because they have elected not to continue therapy or take medication. This is not
acceptable. "Institutionalized discrimination against people with mental illness is
one of the last socially acceptable, government sanctioned threats to the rights of a
large class of citizens and makes the realization of self determination a tenuous and
challenging process for many of them."'19' In our efforts to prevent violent behavior,
we must acknowledge that it simply is not possible to prevent every conceivable act
of violence, nor should we try to do so by tolerating expansive community control
laws designed to oppress the rights of an entire class of people.
19°See, e.g., Monahan, supra note 18, at 519; Friedman, supra note 18, at 2065.
.
91Judith A. Cook & Jessica A. Jonikas, Self-Determination Among Mental Health
Consumers/Survivors: Using Lessons from the Past to Guide the Future, 13 J. OF DISABILITY
POL'Y STUDIES 87, 89 (2002).
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